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Abstract
Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people
in multiple groups based on their individual preferences. This pa-
per suggests an approach to this problem in the framework of a non-
cooperative game theory.
Definition of a suggested finite game includes a family of nested si-
multaneous non-cooperative finite games with intra- and inter-coalition
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externalities. In this family, games differ by the size of maximum coali-
tion, partitions and by coalition structure formation rules.
A result of every game consists of partition of players into coali-
tions and a payoff profile for every player. Every game in the family
has an equilibrium in mixed strategies with possibly more than one
coalition. The results of the game differ from those conventionally
discussed in cooperative game theory, e.g. the Shapley value, strong
Nash, coalition-proof equilibrium, core, kernel, nucleolus.
We discuss the following applications of the new game: cooperation
as an allocation in one coalition, Bayesian games, stochastic games
and construction of a non-cooperative criterion of coalition structure
stability for studying focal points.
Keywords: Noncooperative Games, Nash equilibrium, Shapley value, strong
equilibrium, core.
JEL : C71, C72, C73
1 Introduction
There is a conventional dichotomy in game theory applications, the cooper-
ative game theory (CGT) versus the non-cooperative game theory (NGT).
CGT deals with coalitions as elementary items, NGT deals with strategic
individual behavior.
However, the picture is not so smooth. CGT traditionally disregards is-
sues of strategic interactions between individual players, with players in the
same coalition and players in other coalitions. CGT substitutes an individual
gain by a value of a coalition, a total and not personified gain of everybody.
As a result, value of a coalition does not depend on an allocation of all other
players, and construction of an individual gain requires additional arrange-
ments. From another side NGT with an individual impact on an equilibrium
overlooks structural aspects of player’s partition into groups or into coalition
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structures.1
The two theories even pursue different goals, their outcomes vary in many
ways, and are hard to compile. CGT concentrates on socially desirable al-
locations of players, while efficiency is defined in aggregate terms, rather
than individual, as in the standard definition of Pareto-efficiency. At the
same time NGT aspires towards equilibrium conditions, which later could be
Pareto-improved.
Thus it is not surprising that there are questions beyond the range of
concern for any of the two theories. The present study concentrates on games,
where players can be allocated to different coalitions in an equilibrium, still
preserving traditional for NGT individual strategies and individual payoffs.
This results in two types of externalities from every player, intra-coalition
and inter-coalition ones.
Consider two similar examples: a voluntarily division of participants into
paintball teams or a voluntarily division of a class into studying groups.
Before they are engaged into a team/a group every player/student makes a
decision from self-interest considerations, concerning with whom he/she is,
and how all others are allocated. A decision includes a choice of a preferable
coalition structure, and what to do after it is formed.
In these examples the participants know about commonly accepted mech-
anisms of coalition formation before any activity starts. These mechanisms
resolve possible conflicts between individual choices. Members of the team/the
group may perform different actions inside a team/a group2 formed.3
Intra- and inter-coalition externalities for the paintball game are clear.
Let us discuss two type of externalities for studying group game. There are
maybe intra-coalition externalities in studying groups in a form of mutual
1Coalition structure terminology was used by Aumann and Dreze (1976).
2Indefinite article is used as a formed team/group may not coincide with preferable.
See an example in Section 2.
3This is different from an approach within cooperative game theory, where players from
a coalition perform the same action.
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assistance. Inter-coalition externalities for studying groups could be a mutual
noise, or a slow WiFi connection from an external service.
The common features of the examples include multi-coalition frameworks,
formed from self-concerned (self-interested) behavior of everybody, and two
types of externalities. Thus both examples occur in an area between the
existing cooperative and non-cooperative game theories.
In this paper ‘coalition structure’, or ‘partition’ 4 for short, is a disjoint
union of non-overlapping subsets from a set of players. A group, or a coali-
tion, is an element of a coalition structure or of a partition.5
The examples above may seem to be related to cooperation, as suggested
by Nash (1953). Now his suggestion is known as the Nash Program (Serrano,
2004), and cooperation is understood as an activity inside a group with
positive externalities between players. However both examples above are
more complicated than the existing theories suggest. For example, due to a
multi-coalition framework and two types of externalities.
The best analogy for the difference of the Nash Program from the research
of this paper is the difference between a partial and a general strategic equi-
librium analysis6 in economics. The former isolates a market and ignores
cross-market interactions, the latter explicitly studies cross market interac-
tions from individual strategic actions of self-interested traders.
The novelty of the paper consists in: a construction of a family of nested
non-cooperative games such that every game has an equilibrium in mixed
strategies. Based on the game, the paper presents a non-cooperative crite-
rion for coalition structure stability, that leads to a non-cooperative recon-
sideration of focal points of Schelling. These results reveal new properties of
well-known games, and ask new research questions.7 Using a game similar
4Existing literature uses both terms.
5the same.
6meaning, general equilibrium framework with strategic market games of Shapley and
Shubik.
7 Recently Dasgupta and Maskin (2016) wrote that ’game theory is the study of strate-
gic interaction: how a person should and will behave if her actions affect others and their
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to Prisoner’s Dilemma the paper shows that an efficient and not equilibrium
outcome does not imply allocation of players in one coalition. Further read-
ing to the literature on this subject is available in the Discussion section of
this paper.
The paper addresses only construction and equilibrium issues of a non-
cooperative game, but does not study efficiency of an equilibrium concept.
The paper has the following structure: Section 2 presents an example
based on Prisoner’s Dilemma and demonstrates that there is actually no
explicit cooperation in it. Then Section 3 follows with the main model.
Section 4 contains a discussion of the result and a comparison with existing
literature. Section 5 contains a formal definition of a sufficient criterion for
cooperation. All further sections deal with reconsidering well-known games,
Bayesian games (Section 6), stochastic games (Section 7), and demonstrating
their new properties, including a construction of non-cooperative criterion of
coalition structure stability and reconsidering focal points of Shelling (Section
8). The final section of this paper is a Conclusion.
2 Modified Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
The example demonstrates that there is no explicit cooperation in the stan-
dard PD game, if to think about a cooperation as an allocation of players in
the same coalition. Formal analysis of cooperation is in Section 5.8
Consider a game of two players i = 1, 2, where each can choose to be
alone and has two activity levels: L(ow)i,alone or H(high)i,alone, i = 1, 2. The
players can make only one coalition structure {{1}, {2}}. Payoffs for this
actions affect her‘. The novelty of this paper is that players can be allocated in different
coalitions still making externalities for all others.
8This section contains an example for two players, what may make to think that the
players care about coalitions, not about coalition structures. The suggested mechanism is
constructed to deal with coalition structures. A game of two “introvert” players further in
this paper demonstrates importance of coalition structures. An example, where coalition
structure matter explicitly is in Section 6, Corporate lunch game.
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case are in Table 1. Every cell contains a payoff profile for both players
and an allocation of the players over coalitions. The unique equilibrium
(−2;−2)∗, marked with one star ∗, is inefficient. But the desirable and non-
equilibrium payoff outcome (0; 0) is efficient. Hence the game reproduces
payoff properties of the Prisoner’s Dilemma with an explicit allocation of
players over coalitions structures.
Table 1: Payoff for the standard Prisoners Dilemman
L2,alone H2,alone
L1,alone
(0;0)
{{1}, {2}}
(-5;3)
{{1}, {2}}
H1,alone
(3;-5)
{{1}, {2}}
(−2;−2)∗
{{1}, {2}}
Let the game be more complicated, and the players can choose to be
either alone or together, and as above to choose between two activity levels
for every case. Then set of strategies Si(K = 2) for player i is:
Si(K = 2) =
{
(L1,alone, H1,alone), (L1,together, H1,together)
}
.
Parameter K = 2 indicates that maximum available coalition size for the
players is 2. For simplicity we assume the simplest rule for coalition structure
formation: if at least one of the players chooses to be alone, then a coalition
of two cannot be formed. Payoff matrix for this game is in Table 2.
Every cell in Table 2 contains a payoff profile and a coalition structure.
The upper-left part of Table 2 corresponds to strategies Li,alone and Hi,alone,
i = 1, 2, and coincides with the previous game in Table 1. The previous equi-
librium is marked by one star ∗, the newly discovered equilibria are marked
by two stars ∗∗. It is clear that all new equilibria are still inefficient, but
belong to different coalition structures. An increase in a number of possi-
ble coalition structures enriches a set of equilibria of the game and a set of
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Table 2: Payoff for an extension of Prisoner’s Dilemma.
L2,alone H2,alone L2,together H2,together
L1,alone
(0;0)
{{1}, {2}}
(-5;3)
{{1}, {2}}
(0;0)
{{1}, {2}}
(-5;3)
{{1}, {2}}
H1,alone
(3;-5)
{{1}, {2}}
(−2;−2)∗,∗∗
{{1}, {2}}
(3;-5)
{{1}, {2}}
(−2;−2)∗∗
{{1}, {2}}
L1,together
(0;0)
{{1}, {2}}
(-5;3)
{{1}, {2}}
(0; 0)
{1, 2}
(−5; 3)
{1, 2}
H1,together
(3;-5)
{{1}, {2}}
(−2;−2)∗∗
{{1}, {2}}
(3;−5)
{1, 2}
(−2;−2)∗∗
{1, 2}
equilibrium coalition structures, but not efficiency.
In the coalition structure {{1}, {2}} two players have externalities within
coalitions, which will be further referred to as inter-coalition externalities.
But in the coalition structure {1, 2} the same players experience between
externalities, will be further referred to as intra-coalition externalities.
Formation of {1, 2} requires that two players choose to be together, what-
ever they plan to do inside the coalition structure. It is impossible to im-
plement {1, 2} only from a choice of one player, given coalition structure
formation rule. Inside this coalition structure both players can deviate si-
multaneously from the efficient outcome to the equilibrium.
The feature of the example is that there is no instruction for players on
how to deviate: unilaterally, independently, or within only one coalition, as
in the cooperative game theory. The sets of individual strategies anticipate
all combinations of possible deviations for both players. A formal model in
Section 2 generalizes this idea.
A resulting coalition structure is formed as a result of choices from all
players for a given coalition structure formation rule. Exogenous rules resolve
conflicts between choices of players becoming components of a game.
Table 2 contains four efficient outcomes: (0; 0) located in different coali-
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Table 3: Payoff for two extrovert players who prefer to be together. Unique-
ness of an equilibrium is fixed.
L2,alone H2,alone L2,together H2,together
L1,alone
(0;0)
{{1}, {2}}
(-5;3)
{{1}, {2}}
(0;0)
{{1}, {2}}
(-5;3)
{{1}, {2}}
H1,alone
(3;-5)
{{1}, {2}}
(−2;−2)∗
{{1}, {2}}
(3;-5)
{{1}, {2}}
(−2;−2)
{{1}, {2}}
L1,together
(0;0)
{{1}, {2}}
(-5;3)
{{1}, {2}}
(0 + ǫ; 0 + ǫ)
{1, 2}
(−5 + ǫ; 3 + ǫ)
{1, 2}
H1,together
(3;-5)
{{1}, {2}}
(-2;-2)
{{1}, {2}}
(3 + ǫ;−5 + ǫ)
{1, 2}
(−2 + ǫ;−2 + ǫ)∗∗
{1, 2}
tion structures: this means that by observing only the payoff profiles (0; 0)
we can’t conclude whether players are in one coalition or not. This differs
from a common understanding that the Prisoner’s Dilemma can serve as an
example of unsuccessful cooperation. If to consider a cooperation as an allo-
cation of players in one coalition, we observe, that information about payoff
profile is not enough to assert cooperation existence.
An allocation of players in one coalition can be fixed by addressing to
the game of “extrovert” players. Two players have preferences over coalition
structures and prefer to be together. Let ǫ > 0 be an additional individual
gain (a corporate gain) by contrast from being separate, but only if the grand
coalition {1, 2} is formed. Table 3 contains payoffs for this game. Now the
equilibrium marked with ∗∗ is unique and appears when both players choose
to be together. However it is non-efficient again.
If both players are “introverts”, then each prefers to be alone. If a de-
sirable coalition structure, {{1}, {2}}, is formed, then every player obtains
an additional markup δ > 0. Payoff matrix for this game is in Table 4. The
additional option of being together does not change the equilibrium in com-
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parison to the aforementioned game, where strategies are (Li,alone, Hi,alone),
i = 1, 2.
Table 4: Payoff for two “introvert” players, who prefer to be alone. Unique-
ness of an equilibrium is fixed.
L2,alone H2,alone L2,together H2,together
L1,alone
(0 + δ; 0 + δ)
{{1}, {2}}
(−5 + δ; 3 + δ)
{{1}, {2}}
(0; 0)
{{1}, {2}}
(−5; 3)
{{1}, {2}}
H1,alone
(3 + δ;−5 + δ)
{{1}, {2}}
(−2 + δ;−2 + δ)∗,∗∗
{{1}, {2}}
(3;-5)
{{1}, {2}}
(−2;−2)
{{1}, {2}}
L1,together
(0;0)
{{1}, {2}}
(-5;3)
{{1}, {2}}
(0; 0)
{1, 2}
(−5; 3)
{1, 2}
H1,together
(3;-5)
{{1}, {2}}
(-2;-2)
{{1}, {2}}
(3;−5)
{1, 2}
(−2;−2)
{1, 2}
Consider a case, where the players are different: player i = 1 is “extro-
vert”, but player i = 2 is “introvert”. Table 5 is the payoff matrix for this
game. Following the rule of unanimous agreement to form a coalition the
grand coalition, {1, 2}, can not be formed, and equilibrium strategy profile
for i = 2 does not change in comparison to the first example. For player i = 1
an equilibrium strategy profile is a mixed strategy with equal weights over two
pure strategies H1,alone and H1,together. Final coalition structure {{1}, {2}} is
not affected by this randomization and another coalition structure is unfeasi-
ble. Players have inter-coalition externalities and inefficient outcome. Hence
the mixed strategies induce inter-coalition externalities and two coalitions in
an equilibrium. Games with such properties are not described in existing
literature.
We can summarize the section: expansion of traditional non-cooperative
game theory for coalition structures formation requires additional arrange-
ments. This includes:
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Table 5: Payoff for a game when player 1 is ”extrovert” and player 2 is
”introvert”.
L2,alone H2,alone L2,together H2,together
L1,alone
(0; 0 + δ)
{{1}, {2}}
(−5; 3 + δ)
{{1}, {2}}
(0; 0 + δ)
{{1}, {2}}
(−5; 3 + δ)
{{1}, {2}}
H1,alone
(3;−5 + δ)
{{1}, {2}}
(−2;−2 + δ)∗,∗∗
{{1}, {2}}
(3;−5 + δ)
{{1}, {2}}
(−2;−2 + δ)
{{1}, {2}}
L1,together
(0; 0− 5 + δ)
{{1}, {2}}
(−5; 3 + δ)
{{1}, {2}}
(0 + ǫ; 0)
{1, 2}
(−5 + ǫ; )
{1, 2}
H1,together
(3;−5 + δ)
{{1}, {2}}
(−2;−2 + δ)∗∗
{{1}, {2}}
(3 + ǫ;−5)
{1, 2}
(−2 + ǫ;−2)
{1, 2}
1. to be aware of a maximum available coalition size;
2. to enumerate possible coalition structures for it;
3. individual strategy sets should be related to possible coalition struc-
tures;
4. to embed some mechanism to resolve conflicts between players.
The next section presents a formal model for a non-cooperative game with
coalition structure formation.
3 Formal setup of the model
This section presents a construction of the main model. Nash (1950, 1951)
suggested a non-cooperative game, that consists of a set of players N , with
a general element i, sets of individual finite strategies Si, i ∈ N , and indi-
vidual payoffs, Ui(s), defined for every strategy profile s ∈ S = ×i∈NSi, as
a mapping from a set of all strategies S into a bounded set Ui : S 7→ R,
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Ui(s) <∞. Thus every strategy profile s ∈ S is assigned a vector of payoffs(
Ui(s)
)
i∈N
∈ RN+ , where ui(s) is an individual payoff of i for a strategy pro-
file s. However, the non-cooperative game introduced by Nash says nothing
about coalition structure formation.
The game suggested in this paper follows similar logic of Nash, but with a
preliminary modification for a set of strategy profiles. Every player has a set
of strategies for every relevant coalition structure. A set of all strategy profiles
S, constructed as a Cartesian (direct) product of all individual strategies, is
portioned into non-overlapping domains, as in Section 2. Every constructed
domain is a set of strategy profiles. Every strategy profile inside a domain
is assigned the same coalition structure and a profile of individual payoffs.
This approach reproduces the method of state-contingent payoffs for Arrow-
Debreu securities.
In this section we introduce components for a game, how to assemble
them into a game and now to construct an equilibrium concept for the game.
The common feature of the components is their nested structure, that enables
us to construct a nested family of games.
3.1 Players and partitions
Consider a set of agents N , with a general element i, and denote a size of N
as #N , a finite integer, 2 ≤ #N < ∞. If there is no ambiguity we will use
N also for a size of the set of players.
Introduce a parameterK, taking values from 1 toN . It has two equivalent
interpretations: maximum coalition size and maximum number of deviators.
From one side, in any available coalition structure there is no coalition with
maximum size greater than K. From another, at most K agents are required
to dissolve any coalition in any such coalition structure.
Let n(k) be a subset of players with a size no more than K, n(k) ⊂ N ,
#n(k) ≤ K. A subset n(k) is not a coalition, but a subset of players from N
with an upper restriction on a number of elements. After a coalition structure
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is formed the players from n(k) may appear in different final coalitions.
Every fixed K induces a family of coalition structures (or a family of
partitions) P(K):
P(K) =
{
P : P = {gj : gj ⊂ N, #g ≤ K, ⊔jgj = N}
}
(3.1)
An element P = {gj} of P(K) is a partition of N into coalitions, where j
is an index of a coalition in P . Every coalition has an upper boundary on its
size, #gj ≤ K. The notation ⊔jgj = N means that a player may participate
only in one coalition: ∀j1 6= j2,⇒ gj1 ∩ gj2 = ∅. Size of P is described by a
partition function p(N,K) ( reference).
If we increase K by one, then we need to add new coalition structures
from P(K+1)\P(K), and finally we obtain the nested families of partitions:
P(K = 1) ⊂ . . . ⊂ P(K) ⊂ . . . ⊂ P(K = N).
The bigger K is , the more coalition structures (or partitions) are included
into consideration. The grand coalition, i.e. a coalition of size N , belongs to
the family P(K = N), only.
3.2 Strategies
Take a fixed K and consider a relevant family of coalition structures P(K).
For every partition P from P(K) agent i has a finite strategy set Si(P ) and
a set of strategies of i for P(K) is Si(K) = ∪P∈P(K)Si(P ).
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Definition 1 (individual strategy set). A set of strategies of agent i for a
family of coalition structures P(K) is
Si(K) =
{
si : si ∈ ∪P∈P(K)Si(P )
}
9Finite strategies are used as in Nash (1950).
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with a general element si(K) or si for simplicity.
Agent i chooses si from Si(K). All agents make their choices simul-
taneously. A choice is a choice of a desirable partition and an action
for this partition.10 If we increase K by one, then we need to construct
additional strategies only for the newly available coalition structures from
P(K + 1) \ P(K). This makes strategy sets for different K’s to be nested:
Si(K = 1) ⊂ . . . ⊂ Si(K) ⊂ . . . ⊂ Si(K = N).
We construct sets of strategies of all players from individual strategies in
the usual way, S(K) = ×i∈NSi(K), and it inherits the nesting property:
S(K = 1) ⊂ . . . ⊂ S(K = N).
A choice of all players, a strategy profile, is s(K) =
(
s1(K), . . . , sN(K)
)
∈
S(K), or if there is no ambiguity s ≡ s(K).
One may ask a question, is it possible to make a choice in two stages: first,
all players choose a partition, second, everybody chooses a coalition. Such
reformulation of the game leads to the generalization of strategic equilibrium,
introduced by Mertens (1995), also in Hillas, Kohlberg (2002), that goes
beyond the scope of this paper.
3.3 Coalition structure mechanism
For every K we have a family of coalition structures and a set of strategy
sets. However, individual choices of agents may be inconsistent. To over-
come this deficiency we define a coalition structure formation mechanism
10A desirable partition may not realize due to conflicts in individual choices. It was
demonstrated with examples in the previous section. A sequential game for dynamic
formation coalition structures is in progress with Marc Kelbert and Olga Pushkareva.
Both versions of the game need a mechanism for conflict resolution.
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R(K), (a mechanism or a rule for short) to resolve possible conflicts.11 The
rule portions S(K) into non-overlapping coalition structure specific domains
S(K) = ⊔P∈P(K)S(P ), S(P ) = ×i∈NSi(P ), where disjoint union ⊔ means
that domains for different coalition structures do not overlap. An example
was in Section 2.
A unique coalition structure P from P(K) is assigned for every strat-
egy profile s from S(K). A set of such strategy profiles makes a coalition
structure strategy domain S(P ) = {s = (s1, . . . , si, . . . , sN)}, which may
not be convex, (see examples in Section 2), si ∈ Si(K). It is clear that
S(K) = ⊔P∈P(K)S(P ). For some players a realized coalition structure P
may not coincide with a chosen one.
Definition 2 (a coalition structure formation mechanism). For every K a
coalition structure formation mechanism R(K) is a set of measurable
mappings such that:
1. A domain of R(K) is a set of all strategy profiles of S(K).
2. A range of R(K) is a finite number of subsets S(P ) ⊂ S(K), P ∈
P(K). Every S(P ) is a strategy set for only one coalition structure P .
3. R(K) divides S(K) in such a way that the union of all S(P ) constructs
the original set S(K) = ⊔P∈P(K)S(P ).
Formally the same:
R(K) : S(K) = ×i∈NSi(K) 7→
(
S(P ), P ∈ P(K)
)
: ⊔P∈P(K) S(P )
There are two ways to construct S(K): in terms of initial individual
strategies, S(K) = ×i∈NSi(K), or in terms of realized partition strategies,
S(K) = ⊔P∈P(K)S(P ).
11They can be social norms or social institutions, which people take for granted.
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Holt and Roth (2004) suggested to include a mechanism to eliminate
a distinction between non-cooperative and cooperative games: ‘One trend
in modern game theory, often referred as Nash program, is to erase this
distinction by including any relevant enforcement mechanism in the model,
so that all games can be modeled as non-cooperative’.
Informally, every coalition structure becomes itself a non-cooperative
game: for every coalition structure P there is a set of players, a non-trivial
set of strategies and partition-specific payoffs, described further.
If K increases we need to add a mechanism for strategy sets from S(K +
1) \ S(K) only. This supports consistency of coalition structure formation
mechanisms for different K, and the family of mechanisms is nested:
R(K = 1) ⊂ . . . ⊂ R(K) ⊂ . . . ⊂ R(K = N).
It is important to note that a role of a mechanism is to identify domains for
coalition structures, but not to deal with efficiency of results (see inefficient
equilibria in Section 2).12 Studying efficiency requires studying properties
of all possible measurable transformations R(K), that goes far beyond this
paper. Discussion of some properties of R(K) is in the next section.
3.4 Payoffs
For every K we have a family of coalition structures, a set of strategy sets
and coalition structure formation rules. And now within every given coalition
structure for every strategy profile we define a payoffs profile. Payoffs are
considered as von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities.
Definition 3 (coalition structure specific individual payoff). For every coali-
tion structure P from P(K) player i, i ∈ N , has a payoff function
Ui(P ) : S(P )→ R+,
12Efficiency in non-cooperative and cooperative game theories is understood differently.
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such that Ui(P ) is bounded, Ui <∞.
Definition of payoffs for all feasible coalition structures generalizes the
definition above.
Definition 4 (family of coalition structure specific individual payoffs). For
given maximum coalition size K, family of coalition structures P(K), set of
strategy profiles S(K), payoffs of player i from N , make a family:
Ui(K) =
{
Ui
(
P
)
: P ∈ P(K), S(K) = ⊔P∈P(K)S(P )
}
,
where Ui
(
P
)
is a set of coalition structure specific payoffs for i.
Every coalition structure has a strategy domain S(P ), and a set of payoffs,(
Ui
(
S(P )
))
i∈N
, defined on this domain. Thus, every coalition structure is
a non-cooperative game itself.
An increment in K increases a number of possible partitions and a set
of feasible strategies for every player. Thus we need to add only payoffs for
newly added coalition structures from P(K+1)\P(K). Not surprisingly we
obtain a nested family of payoff functions:
Ui(K = 1) ⊂ . . . ⊂ Ui(K) ⊂ . . . ⊂ Ui(K = N).
It is clear that in every coalition structure players can have both intra
and inter coalition externalities.
3.5 Game
For every K we have a family of coalition structures, strategy sets, coalition
structure formation rules and families of payoffs and now, we define a game.
Definition 5 ( a simultaneous coalition structure formation game). A non-
cooperative game for coalition structure formation with maximum coalition
16
size K is
Γ(K) =
〈
N,
{
K,P(K),R(K)
}
,
(
Si(K),Ui(K)
)
i∈N
〉
,
where
{
K,P(K),R(K)
}
- coalition structure formation mechanism (a social
norm, a social institute),
(
Si(K),Ui(K)
)
i∈N
- properties of players in N ,
(individual strategies and payoffs), such that:
×i∈NSi(K)
R(K)
→
{
S(P ) : P ∈ P(K)
}
→
{(
Ui(K)
)
i∈N
}
P∈P(K)
.
If we omit the mechanism part of the game, i.e. take K = 1, and forget
about the coalition structures, then we obtain the traditional non-cooperative
game of Nash. It is clear that for different K’s the constructed games are
nested.
Definition 6 (family of games). A family of games is nested if :
G = Γ(K = 1) ⊂ . . . ⊂ Γ(K) ⊂ . . . ⊂ Γ(K = N).
Nested games are important to study changes in an equilibrium with an
increase in a number of deviators or maximum coalition’s size K.
3.6 Equilibrium
Let Si(K) be a finite set of strategies of player i. Let ∆i(K) be a set of all
mixed strategies (probability measures or probability distributions) of player
i, i.e. a space of probability measures over Si(K),
∆i(K) =
{
σi(K) :
∑
P∈P(K)
∑
si∈Si(K)
σi(si) = 1
}
.
Let σi(K) be a mixed strategy of i, σi(K) ∈ ∆i(K).
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Sets of mixed strategies for players different from i are defined in the
standard way:
∆−i(K) =
{
σ−i =
∏
j 6=i
σj(K) : ∀j 6= i
}
.
Set of all strategies S(K) has two representations, S(K) = ×i∈NSi(K)
and S(K) = ⊔P∈P(K)S(P ). Thus there are two parallel and equivalent ways
to construct expected utility.
Expected utility of i in terms of individual strategies (Si(K))i∈N is
EU
Γ(K)
i
(
σi(K), σ−i(K)
)
=
∑
P∈P(K)
∑
si∈Si(P )
Ui(si, s−i)σi(K)σ−i(K),
and is defined in terms of realized coalition structures from P(K).
Definition 7 (an equilibrium in a game Γ(K) ). There is a non-cooperative
game for coalition structure formation
Γ(K) =
〈
N,
{
K,P(K),R(K)
}
,
(
Si(K),Ui(K)
)
i∈N
〉
.
A mixed strategies profile σ∗(K) =
(
σ∗i (K)
)
i∈N
is an equilibrium for a game
Γ(K) if for every subset n(k) from N , with a size 1 ≤ k ≤ K, and for every
player i ∈ n(k) a deviation from an equilibrium, σi(K) 6= σ
∗
i (K), does not
generate an individual gain:
EU
Γ(K)
i
(
σ∗i (K), σ
∗
−i(K)
)
≥ EUΓ(K)i
(
σi(K), σ
∗
−i(K)
)
.
The difference with Nash equilibrium is that an equilibrium must be satis-
fied not for every player i fromN , but for every player i from every subsetn(k)
from N , where a size of n(k) does not exceed K. Informally this means that
any k ≤ K deviators do not have restriction to move either separately or
together. Players from n(k) can deviate in any combinations, what is antic-
ipated in their strategy sets in construction of the game,
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Possible deviations from an equilibrium are constructed differently from
those used in the strong Nash equilibrium, in the core or in the coalition-proof
equilibrium. This property of the simultaneous deviation already appeared
in the Prisoner’s Dilemma example, where if players have an option to be
together, then they must be aware of a deviation of both in an equilibrium.
Theorem 1. A game Γ(K) has an equilibrium in mixed strategies.
A set of finite strategies has a simplex as a set of mixed strategies. Simplex
is a compact set. Set of mixed strategies of all players is a combination of
finite number of simplex, what is again a compact set. Continuous utility
function function reaches a maximum value on this simplex. Thus there is
always a Nash equilibrium for finite strategies in Γ(K). Nash theorem with
finite strategies is the partial case for K = 1. The result of the paper is
not in a trivial mathematical theorem, but in introduction of a new game to
solve earlier untreatable problems with any number of deviators structured
by groups. This new game follows the same rules, as the game suggested by
Nash.
The equilibrium result is different from results of the cooperative game
theory, where games with empty cores may exist. The suggested non-cooperative
equilibrium does not demand super-additivity, transferable / non-transferable
utilities, axioms on payoffs or weights. Existence of an equilibrium does not
imply that it is efficient.
The advantage of the theorem is that it can be generalized for any relevant
K. New insight of the result is not in complexity of mathematical objects,
but in constructing a more general structure of a game, which allow to ask
new questions and to reconsider old games.
Theorem 2. The family of games G = {Γ(K), K = 1, 2, . . . , N} has equilib-
rium mixed strategies profiles for every K:
σ∗(G) =
(
σ∗(K = 1), . . . , σ∗(K)i∈N , . . . , σ
∗(K = N)
)
,
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where σ∗(K) =
(
σ∗i (K)
)
i∈N
is an equilibrium for a game Γ(K).
The proof is simple. A players i’s finite set of pure strategies has simplex
as a set of mixed strategies. Then a set of all strategies of a game Γ(K) is
a convex subset of Rp(N,K), where p(N,K) is partition function. Then by
Brouwer’s fixed point theorem a continuous mapping from a convex compact
set in a finite dimensional Euclidean space into a convex subset of the same
finite dimensional Euclidean space has a fixed point.
Thus every game for a coalition structure formation has an equilibrium
for any number of deviators. It is clear that further development of the model
requires setting the standard problem of equilibrium refinement.
An equilibrium in the game can also be characterized by equilibrium
partitions.
Definition 8 (equilibrium coalition structures or partitions). A set
of partitions {P ∗(K)}, {P ∗(K)} ⊂ P(K), of a game Γ(K), is a set of equi-
librium partitions, if it is induced by an equilibrium strategy profile σ∗(K) =(
σ∗i (K)
)
i∈N
.
Robustness of an equilibrium to an increase in K is addressed in Section
8.
4 Discussion
At the moment there are two competing game theories: the non-cooperative
and the cooperative. In early 60-s Aumann (1960) wrote that ‘the non-
cooperative game differs from the cooperative game chiefly in that the use
of correlated strategy vectors that are not also mixed strategies vectors are
forbidden’. The current paper demands another description of the difference:
the non-cooperative game theory is based on mapping of a strategy profile of
all players (a subset from RN) into a payoff profile for all players (a bounded
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subset from RN). The cooperative game theory is based on mapping13 of
subsets of integer numbers (a subset from N) into a subset of real numbers
(a subset from R).
The model of this paper explicitly assumes that every self-interested agent
produces a relevant impact for all other players, independently from their
coalition location. The resulting impact can be either positive or negative.
This idea requires modification of the above to be explained missed in existing
non-cooperative and existing cooperative game theories.
A possible irrelevance of cross-coalition externalities leaves a space for a
co-existence of the non-cooperative and the cooperative game theories.
Inedequacy of cooperative game theory to study coalitions and coalition
structures was noted earlier by many authors. Maskin (2011) wrote that
‘features of cooperative theory are problematic because most applications of
game theory to economics involve settings in which externalities are impor-
tant, Pareto inefficiency arises, and the grand coalition does not form’.14.
Myerson (p.370, 1991) noted that ‘we need some model of cooperative be-
havior that does not abandon the individual decision-theoretic foundations
of game theory’. Therefore, there is a demand for a non-cooperative game
to study non-cooperative formation of coalition structures.
4.1 Referring to existing literature
There are volumes of literature on coalitions, and this list of highly respected
list authors is far from complete: Aumann, Hart, Holt, Kurz, Maschler,
Maskin, Moulen, Myerson, Peleg, Roth, Serrano, Shapley, Schmeidler, We-
ber, Winter, Wooders and many others. All the authors address highly
significant specific issues. However addressing a particular issue is not the
same as a solution for a general problem, formation of coalition structures
13 a characteristic function
14or that ‘characteristic function ... rules out externalities, situations when a coalition
payoff depends on what other coalitions are doing’, Maskin, (2016)
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from self-interest fundamentals. The solution for a fundamental problem is
not abundance in literature and is not abundant in current literature. For
the purpose of this paper one needs to seek answers for certain questions:
Problem Identification: What are the specific properties of a general prob-
lem?
Solution Existence: Do existing solutions satisfy these properties?
Choice of a tool: Do existing tools challenge them enough?
4.1.1 Identification of a problem
There are different views on complexities for non-cooperative formation of
coalition structures. There are two opinions above, two recent ones are below.
Serrano (2014) wrote: ‘the axiomatic route find difficulties identifying
solutions’, and that for studying coalition formation ‘it maybe worth to use
strategic-form games, as proposed in the Nash Program’. Ray and Vohra
(2015) wrote on complexity and contradictions in existing approaches. They
offer a systematic view on the field, based on ‘collection of coalitions’, or a
modified cooperative game theory:
‘Yet as one surveys the landscape of this area of research, the first feature
that attracts attention is “the fragmented nature of the literature” ... The
literature on coalition formation embodies two classical approaches that es-
sentially form two parts of this chapter: (i) The blocking approach, in which
we require the immunity of a coalition arrangement to blocking, perhaps
subcoalitions or by other groups which intersect the coalition in question...
(ii) Noncooperative bargaining, in which individuals make proposals to form
a coalition, which can be accepted or rejected...
After all, the basic methodologies differ apparently at “an irreconcilable
level” over cooperative and noncooperative game approaches... ’
Every presented view describes only a special part of the general problem
and suggests a partial solution for it. Existing diversity of views, ‘irrecon-
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cilable’ approaches and ‘the fragmented nature’, enable us to conclude: the
long lasting problem of structuring people in multiple groups based on their
individual preferences and individual actions is still not well-identified: a
‘difficult to identify problem’ cannot be easily solved in a consistent way
This paper considers the general problem as: how to construct coalition
structures with multiple coalitions, intra/inter coalition externalities only
from non-cooperative actions of players.
4.1.2 Existence of a solution
‘A problem cannot be solved if it’s bounds are unknown’ (A. Tchekmarev15).
The current paper dares to suggest a general identification for the problem
and a consistent, natural solution for it. This game generalizes the concept
of non-cooperative games introduced by Nash to study formation of coalition
structure with many possible coalitions.
4.1.3 A tool
How to deal with the problem, which has not been solved and has ‘the frag-
mented nature’? The answer comes from Albert Einstein: ‘The significant
problems we have cannot be solved at the same level of thinking with which
we created them’. The current paper dares to suggest a new tool, presented
in Section 3.
4.2 Comparison with existing approaches
4.2.1 A threat
A threat as a tool for coalition formation analysis was suggested by Nash
(1953), and earlier by von Neumann and Morgenstern. It starts from a
strategy profile, a threat, from a subset of players, possibly allocated in
15Personal communication on engineering design.
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different coalitions. Let this profile be a threat to someone beyond this
subset. The threatening players may produce externalities for each other
(and negative externalities are not excluded!). Then how can we describe the
externalities for members of the subset if the threat is an elementary tool?
At the same time there maybe some other player(s) beyond the subset, who
may benefit from the threat. But they may have no motivation to join those
who are threatening. For example, some additional adverse externalities
may appear. Such issues should be included into consideration of coalition
structure formation.
There is a parallel argument against using the threat as an elementary
tool. Assume there are several agents, who individually cannot make a threat
to some others, and these small agents are allocated in different coalitions.
A credible threat may come only from many small players. Does this mean
that the small agents should join together? They may have their own con-
tradictions to join in one coalition. Maybe a formal example will be more
illustrative here, but the volume of the paper does is excessive.
4.2.2 Usage of the non-cooperative approach
The justification for usage of non-cooperative games as a tool for coalition
structure formation, comes from Maskin (2011) and the recent remark from
Serrano (2014): ‘it maybe worth to use strategic-form games, as proposed in
the Nash Program’.
There is a difference in the research agenda of this paper from the Nash
Program (Serrano 2004). Nash program aims to study a non-cooperative
formation of one coalition, but this paper aims to study non-cooperative for-
mation of coalition structures, possibly with more than one coalition. The
constructed finite non-cooperative game allows to study what can be a co-
operative behavior, when the individuals ‘rationally expand their individual
interests’ ( Olson, 1971), see the next section.
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4.2.3 Novelties of the paper
Nash (1950, 1951) suggested to construct a non-cooperative game as a map-
ping from a set of strategies into a set of payoffs,
(Ui)i∈N : ×i∈N Si → R
N , (Ui)i∈N <∞.
This paper has two additions in comparison to his paper: construction
of a non-cooperative game with an embedded coalition structure formation
mechanism and a parametrization of games by a number of deviators K,
K = 1, . . . ,#N :
{(
Ui(S(P ))
)
i∈N
}
P∈P(K)
: ×i∈NSi(K)
R(K)
→ {S(P ) : P ∈ P(K)} → (RN)p(N,K),
where M is a number of coalition structures from N players with the restric-
tion K on coalition sizes. The game suggested by Nash becomes a partial
case for these games, where coalition structures do not matter and only one
player deviates, K = 1.
Every result of the suggested game consists of two parts: 1/ a payoff pro-
file for all players; 2/ an allocation of all players over coalitions. Equilibrium
in mixed strategies always exists and may not be efficient like in traditional
non-cooperative games.
We can take R(K), K = 1, . . . , N , as a trustworthy social institute.
Application of R(K) evokes two issues: how to construct an equilibrium
(modelled in this paper), and how to achieve social efficiency equilibrium
(beyond the scope of this paper). Studying efficiency requires an explicit
description for all possible coalition structure formation rules. Then one can
define social desirability in terms of final individual payoffs and allocations
of players. This is the big research program left for the future.
Further development of this research leads to a non-cooperative welfare
theory with reconsideration of the first and second welfare theorems and
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Arrow’s impossibility theorem. These projects can be applied in sociology,
management, social and political theories, where disagreement on rules of
coalition structure formation can be interpreted as a social or a political
conflict. All such issues are left for the future. The author believes that this
new research direction will enrich non-cooperative game theory and provide
non-cooperative fundamentals for social and mechanism design.
4.2.4 Differences from cooperative game theory concepts
There are volumes of great literature on the cooperative game theory, with
the famous equilibrium concepts: the strong Nash equilibrium (sometimes it
is considered as the non-cooperative equilibrium concept), the Shapley value,
the coalition-proof equilibrium, the nucleolus, the kernel, the bargaining set
and some other.
They share a list of common differences with the equilibrium concept in-
troduced here: every player does not make an individual choice and does
not obtain an individual payoff. In equilibrium there are no intra- and inter-
coalition externalities for every player. A coalition value, (in terminology of
cooperative game theory, a sum of individual payoffs of all coalition mem-
bers), does not depend on a whole coalition structure.
There are other more specific differences with every existing cooperative
game theory equilibrium concept. Differences from the core approach of
Aumann (1960) are clear: no restriction that only one group deviates, no
restriction on the direction of a deviation (inside or outside), and a construc-
tion of individual payoffs from a strategy profile of all players. There is no
need to assume transferable/non-transferable utilities for players.
The approach does not need to use the blocking coalition approach, which
does not study simultaneous deviation of more than one coalition, and ignores
externalities between deviators in the coalition and the original set of players.
Construction of a sequential game with coalition structure formation will
26
follow in the next paper.16
The role of a central planner in the current paper is different from the one
introduced by Nash, who ‘argued that cooperative actions are the result of
some process of bargaining’ Myerson (p.370, 1991). The central planner offers
a predefined family of coalition structure formation mechanisms, a family of
eligible partitions and a family of rules to construct these partitions from
individual strategies of players.
Based on the properties of the game we can propose a criterion of stability
of coalition structures and study self-enforcing properties of an equilibrium.
These properties cannot be designed within existing game theories.
5 Formal definition of cooperation
In the examples from Section 2 we have seen that efficiency does not imply
cooperation. This section formalizes cooperation as an allocation of players in
one coalition independently from Pareto efficiency. A suggested cooperation
criterion is sufficient and can be relaxed in many ways.
Definition 9 (complete cooperation in a coalition). There is a non-cooperative
game Γ(K) with an equilibrium σ∗(K) = (σ∗i )i∈N . A set of players g, “coop-
erate completely in the coalition g” if for every player i ∈ g there are:
ex ante: for every i in g, a coalition g always belongs to an individually
chosen coalition structure, Pi , i.e. if si is chosen by i, and si ∈ Si(Pi),
then g ∈ Pi.
17
ex post: every realized equilibrium coalition structure contains g, i.e. g ∈
∀P ∗, where P ∗ is a formed equilibrium partition of Γ(K),
16M.Kelbert, O.Pushkareva, D. Levando Formation of coalition structures as an ex-
tended form game, mimeo.
17However coalition structures chosen by different players maybe different.
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Cooperation is defined for a game Γ(K) with a fixed K. If K increases
the cooperation may evaporate.
After the game is over the coalition g always belongs to every final equilib-
rium coalition structure, disregarding allocation of players in other coalitions.
A final partition may differ from an individual choice, but will contain the
desirable coalition.
6 Application: Bayesian games
Equilibrium mixed strategies may exist inside one coalition, inducing intra-
coalition externalities. To show this, we reconsider the standard Battle of
the Sexes (BoS) game.
There are two players, Ann and Bob. Each has two options: to be together
or to be alone. In every option each can choose where to go: Boxing or
Opera. Every player has four strategies, in total 16 outcomes. Every outcome
consists of a payoff profile and a partition (or a coalition structure). Assume
both players have preferences over coalition structures: they prefer to be
together, as in the game above with two extrovert players.
The rules of coalition structure formation mechanism are:
1. If they both choose to be together, i.e. both choose the coalition struc-
ture Ptogether = {Ann,Bob} then:
(a) if they choose the same action (i.e. both chooses Boxing or both
chooses Opera), then they they both made the same choice;
(b) otherwise they do not go anywhere, but enjoy just being together;
2. if at least one of them chooses to remain alone, i.e. chooses a parti-
tion Palone = {{Ann}, {Bob}}, then each goes alone to where she/he
chooses, maybe to a different Opera or to a different Boxing match.
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Table 6: Payoff for the Battle of the Sexes game. B is for Boxing, O is for
Opera. If the players choose to be together, and it is realized, then each
obtains an additional fixed payoff ǫ > 0 in any outcome.
BBob,alone OBob,alone BBob,together OBob,together
BAnn,alone
(2; 1)∗
{{1}, {2}}
(0;0)
{{1}, {2}}
(2;1)
{{1}, {2}}
(0;0)
{{1}, {2}}
OAnn,alone
(0;0)
{{1}, {2}}
(1; 2)∗
{{1}, {2}}
(0;0)
{{1}, {2}}
(1;2)
{{1}, {2}}
BAnn,together
(2;1)
{{1}, {2}}
(0;0)
{{1}, {2}}
(2 + ǫ; 1 + ǫ)∗∗
{1, 2}
(ǫ; ǫ)
{1, 2}
OAnn,together
(0;0)
{{1}, {2}}
(1;2)
{{1}, {2}}
(ǫ; ǫ)
{1, 2}
(1 + ǫ; 2 + ǫ)∗∗
{1, 2}
Formally the coalition structure formation rules are:
R(K = 1): S(K = 1) 7→ S(P = {{Ann}, {Bob}}),
∀s ∈ Si(K = 1) = {OAnn,alone, BAnn,alone} × {OBob,alone, BBob,alone}
and
R(K = 2): S(K = 2) 7→


S(P = {Ann,Bob}) =
{
s :
s ∈ {OAnn,together, BAnn,together} × {OBob,together, BBob,together}
S
(
P = {{Ann}, {Bob}}
)
=
S(K = 2) \ S(P = {Ann,Bob}}) otherwise
.
Table 6 corresponds to the game with K = 2, where the game for K = 1
is a nested component. If Ann and Bob play the game with K = 1, a single
coalition structure {{Ann}, {Bob}} game, then the payoffs for this game are
in the two-by-two top-left corner of Table 6, and this is the standard game.
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If Ann and Bob are together, then each obtains an additional payoff ǫ, and
the corresponding cells make the two-by-two bottom-right corner of Table 6.
BoS game with one deviator (K = 1) has two equilibria in pure strategies
and one in mixed. ForK = 2 only mixed strategy equilibrium survives, as two
player can deviate simultaneously. Mixed equilibrium for K = 2 differs from
one for K = 1: another domain of pure strategies makes another coalition
structure and another payoff profile. Mixed strategies equilibrium for Ann
is: σ∗(BAnn,together) = (1 + ǫ)/(3 + 2ǫ), σ
∗(OAnn,together) = (2 + ǫ)/(3 + 2ǫ).
Equilibrium mixed strategies may appear for every K = 1, 2. But for
K = 2 equilibrium coalition structure is the grand coalition, where individual
payoffs fluctuate. More of that, forK = 2 a value of the grand coalition holds
constant for equilibrium mixed strategies. Such games are not described in
available literature.
7 Application: Stochastic games
Shapley (1953) defined stochastic games as ‘the play proceeds by steps from
position to position, according to transition probabilities controlled jointly
by the two player’. This section demonstrates how to construct this type of
games.
The example below differs from the one above in two respects. A set
of equilibrium mixed strategies induces more than one equilibrium coalition
structure. Another difference is that an individual payoff of a coalition de-
pends on a coalition structure to which it belongs. This game is the closest
to studying group/paintball team examples in the introduction of the paper.
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7.1 Corporate lunch game
There is a set of four identical players N = {A,B,C,D}. A coalition struc-
ture is an allocation of players over no more than four separate tables. 18 A
strategy of i is a coalition structure, or an allocation of all players across ta-
bles during a lunch. Different from previous examples there are no strategies
inside coalitions, a pure strategy is a coalition structure.
A rule of coalition structure formation is that any coalition in any coali-
tion structure can be formed only from a unanimous agreement from members
of this coalition.
A player has preferences over coalition structures: she/he prefers to eat
with another one, but also prefers that all other players eat individually.
Possible motivation could be a dissipation of information or gossips. From
the other side, if one eats alone he/she is hurt by formed coalition of others.
If individual choices of coalition structures are inconsistent, then we apply
the rule of coalition structure formation. The first column of Table 7 contains
formed coalition structures.
Payoffs in Table 7 are organized to satisfy the individual preferences de-
scribed above. Take column 4 and compare payoff for the coalition {A,B} in
different coalition structures: line 1, {{A,B}, {C}, {D}} and line 8, {{A,B}, {C,D}}.
Player C prefers to eat with D, but also prefers A and B do not eat together.
This is described as that payoffs of the coalition {C,D} depend on the whole
coalition structure. This result is impossible in existing cooperative game
theory: a coalition value depends on allocation of all players.
Let maximum number of players in a coalition be 2, K = 2. In equilibrium
every player chooses those coalition structures, where she/he is with someone,
while others are separate. Equilibrium mixed strategies are indicated only
for player A.
Several different coalition structures can form in an equilibrium. Each of
them can be considered as a state of a stochastic game.
18Possibly empty tables do not matter, and tables can not be moved.
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Table 7: Office lunch game: strategies and payoff profiles. Full set of equi-
librium mixed strategies are indicated only for player A.
num Coalition structure Payoff profile UA, UB, UC , UD
Coalition values
as in
cooperative game theory
1∗ {A,B}, {C}, {D}: σ∗A = σ
∗
B = 1/3 (10,10,3,3) 20A,B, 3C , 3D
2∗ {A,C}, {B}, {D}: σ∗A = σ
∗
C = 1/3 (10,3,10,3) 20A,C, 3B, 3D
3∗ {A,D}, {C}, {B}: σ∗A = σ
∗
D = 1/3 (10,3,3,10) 20A,C , 3C , 3B
4 {A}, {B}, {C,D} (3,3,10,10) 3A, 3B, 20C,D
5 {A}, {D}, {B,C} (3,10,10, 3) 3A, 3D, 20C,B
6 {A}, {C}, {B,D} (3,10,3,10) 3A, 3C , 20B,D
7 {A}, {B}, {C}, {D} (3,3,3,3) 3A, 3B, 3C , 3D
8 {A,B}, {C,D} (3,3,3,3) 6A,B, 6C,D
9 {A,C}, {B,D} (3,3,3,3) 6A,C, 6B,D
10 {A,D}, {B,C} (3,3,3,3) 6A,D, 6B,C
11 all other with K = 3, 4 (0,0,0,0) = 0
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An increase in K, maximum coalition size, decreases payoffs for all play-
ers. An increment of K from 2 to 3 and then to 4 does not change an
equilibrium in mixed strategies. Thus the equilibrium for K = 2 is robust to
greater Ks. This issue is addressed Section 8.
7.2 A formal definition of a stochastic game of coali-
tion structure formation
Let Γ(K) be a non-cooperative game as defined above.
Definition 10. A game Γ(K) is a stochastic game if a set of equilibrium par-
titions is bigger than one, #({P ∗}(K)) ≥ 2, where a state is an equilibrium
partition P ∗, P ∗ ∈ {P ∗}(K).
Studying properties of stochastic games with non-cooperative coalition
structure formation is left for the future.
8 Application: non-cooperative criterion for
stability
The Nash equilibrium, as defined in Nash (1950, 1951), does not specify
how a player may deviate within a group. This leads to cases, when desir-
able outcomes cannot be supported by Nash equilibrium, while an outcome
intuitively requires studying possible deviations of more than one player.
Sometimes such points are called ‘focal points’ (Schelling).
Aumann (1990) demonstrates absence of a self-enforcement property of
Nash equilibrium for a focal point in ‘a stag and hare game’. The key problem
is that standard Nash equilibrium does not have a tool to study deviations
of more than one player. An example below explains how to change the
basic game to make joint hunting for a stag become an equilibrium focal
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point robust to a deviation of two players. Then the paper presents a non-
cooperative criterion to measure stability of a coalition structure.
There are two hunters i = 1, 2. If they can hunt (only) separately, then
K = 1, and the only available partition is Palone = {{1}, {2}}. An individual
strategy set of i is
Si(K = 1) =
{
(Palone, hare), (Palone, stag)
}
with a general element si. Every si consists of two terms: who is the hunting
partner (oneself) and what is the animal to hunt. For example, a strategy
si = (Psepar, hare) is interpreted as a strategy for i to hunt alone for a hare.
A set of corresponding strategies for the game with K = 1 is
S(K = 1) = S1(K = 1)× S1(K = 1).
For a game with K = 2 every hunter can additionally choose to hunt in
a company of two and as before to choose a target for hunting: a hare or a
stag. A set of strategies of i is
Si(K = 2) =
{
(Palone, hare), (Palone, stag), (Ptogether, hare), (Ptogether, stag)
}
.
A set of strategies of the game is a direct (Cartesian) product,
S(K = 2) = S1(K = 2)× S2(K = 2).
We do not rewrite the rules for coalition structure formation, as they
are the same as in the Battle of the Sexes game above. The difference is in
renaming strategies. Every player knows, which game is played, either with
K = 1 or with K = 2, and this is the common knowledge.
Payoffs for the games Γ(K = 1) and Γ(K = 2) are in Table 8. Some
payoff profiles have a special interpretation: (8; 8) - every hunter obtains a
hare, (4; 4) - two hunters obtain a hare for two, (100; 100) - both hunters
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obtain one stag. The point (100; 100) is a desirable outcome and a focal
point, which cannot be supported as the Nash equilibrium with one deviator
Aumann (1990).
For a game with K = 1 maximum achievable payoff is (8, 8), when each
hunts individually for a hare. An equilibrium strategy profile is
s∗(K = 1) =
(
(Palone, hare), (Palone, hare)
)
with the payoff profile (8; 8). In the game Γ(K = 1) the players cannot
reach the efficient outcome (100, 100). It is available only if both hunters can
decide to hunt together. This focal point (in terminology of Schelling) can
be reached only within the game Γ(K = 2), but not for the game Γ(K = 1).
This is the explanation for the problem posed by Aumann: there can be an
attractive outcome of a game, but it cannot be described in terms of a Nash
equilibrium of a traditional non-cooperative game. Deviation of two players
demands additional tools for the model.
An equilibrium strategy profile is one when hunters can operate together:
s∗(K = 2) =
(
(Ptogether, hare), (Ptogether, hare)
)
and reach the payoff profile (100; 100). The focal point (100; 100) is an equi-
librium for the game Γ(K = 2), but it is unfeasible for the game Γ(K = 1).
Table 8: Expanded stag and hare game
Palone, hare Palone, stag Ptogether,hare Ptogether, stag
Palone,hare (8; 8)
∗; {{1}, {2}} (8;0); {{1}, {2}} (8;8);{{1}, {2}} (8;0); {{1}, {2}}
Palone, stag (0;8); {{1}, {2}} (0;0); {{1}, {2}} (0;8); {{1}, {2}} (0;0); {{1}, {2}}
Ptogether, hare (8;8); {{1}, {2}} (8;0); {{1}, {2}} (4;4); {1, 2} (8;0); {1, 2}
Ptogether, stag (0;8); {{1}, {2}} (0;0) ;{{1}, {2}} (0;8);{1, 2} (100; 100)
∗∗; {1, 2}
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If it is uncertain, which game is played, either Γ(K = 1) or Γ(K =
2), then players will randomize between two strategies: (Palone, hare) and
(Psepar, stag) , and the game become a stochastic game.
8.1 Criterion of coalition structure (a partition) sta-
bility
There is a nested family of games
G = {Γ(K = 1), . . . ,Γ(K), . . .Γ(K = N)} :
such that
Γ(K = 1) ⊂ . . . ⊂ Γ(K) ⊂ . . . ⊂ Γ(K = N).
A list of corresponding mixed strategies equilibria is
(
σ∗(1), . . . , σ∗(K), . . . , σ∗(K = N)
)
,
where σ∗(K) = (σ∗i (K))i∈N . Resulting equilibrium coalition structures (par-
titions) are :
(
{P ∗}(1), . . . , {P ∗}(K), . . . , {P ∗}(K = N)
)
,
where for every K = 1,#N there is {P ∗}(K) ⊂ P(K).
The family of games has an equilibrium expected payoff profiles:
(
(EU
Γ(1)
i )
∗
i∈N , . . . , (EU
Γ(K)
i )
∗
i∈N , . . . , (EU
Γ(K=N)
i )
∗
i∈N
)
,
where (EU
Γ(K)
i )
∗
i∈N ≡ (EU
Γ(K)
i (σ
∗))i∈N .
Take a game Γ(K0) from G with maximum coalition size K0. It has
σ∗(K0) as an equilibrium mixed strategy profile. The question is: what is
the condition when an equilibrium strategy profile does not change with an
increase in maximum coalition size K?
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The suggested criterion is based on the idea that a set of mixed strategies
should not change with an increase inK, σ∗(K0) = σ
∗(K0+1) = . . . = σ
∗(N),
with the restriction Dom(σ∗(K0)) = Dom(σ
∗(K0+1)) = . . . = Dom(σ
∗(N)),
where Dom is a domain of equilibrium mixed strategies. The same in other
words, if a game Γ(K0) is substituted sequentially by games Γ(K + 1) upto
Γ(N), then an equilibrium strategy profile will not change in domain and
in range. The next criterion is a sufficient criterion for coalition structure
stability.
Definition 11. Coalition structure (partition) stability criterion for
a game Γ(K0) is a maximum coalition size K
∗, when an equilibrium still holds
true, i.e. for all i ∈ N there is a number K∗ such that
1.
K∗ = max
K=K0,...,N
Γ(K0)...,Γ(K=N)
{
EU
Γ(K0)
i
(
σ∗i (K0), σ
∗
−i(K0)
)
≥ EU
Γ(K)
i
(
σ∗i (K), σ
∗
−i(K)
)}
,
2. Dom σ∗(K∗) = Dom σ∗(K0)
where σ∗(K0) is an equilibrium in the game Γ(K0), while σ
∗(K) is an equilib-
rium in a game Γ(K), K = K0, . . . , N , and Dom is a domain of equilibrium
mixed strategies set.
The definition is operational, it can be constructed directly from a def-
inition of a family of games G. It guarantees stability of both payoffs and
partitions. In Prisoner’s Dilemma example (where both players are “non-
extroverts”, “non-introverts”) an increment in K increases a number of equi-
librium coalition structures without a change in payoffs. This increases a
number of equilibria, without rejecting one for K = 1. The criterion sug-
gests K∗ = 2 for this game. The lunch game (Section 7) example has robust
equilibrium for K∗ = 2. Some applications may require weaker forms of the
criterion.
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In the extended version of stag and hare game an increase in K changed
the equilibrium. The same took place in a variation of Battle of the Sexes
game. However this did not happen in the Corporate Lunch game.
The proposed criterion may serve as a measure of trust to an equilibrium
or as a test for self-enforcement of an equilibrium. This criterion can be
applied to study opportunistic behavior in coalition partitions. If players in
a coalition g of a game Γ(K1) have perfect cooperation (Section 5), this does
not mean that in a wider game Γ(K2), K1 < K2, they will still cooperate.
Studying stability is tightly connected to studying focal points. The
suggestion of the criterion is only the first step to the big field of research.
9 Conclusion
Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people in multiple
groups based on their individual preferences. The paper presents a family of
non-cooperative finite games for coalition structure formation motivated by
self-interest benefits. Every game in a family has an equilibrium in mixed
strategies. Examples demonstrate how the approach can be applied to study
some popular games. The paper introduces a non-cooperative criterion to
measure stability of coalition structures based on maximum number of devi-
ators.
The novelty of the paper is not in mathematical, but in the structural
result. The suggested family of games can help to study new issues, earlier
beyond the scope of research, for example, focal points. Development of the
model for repeated and network games are in other forthcoming papers from
the author and his colleagues.
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